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Abstract
We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of in-
ternalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive
proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic
non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs
effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communica-
tion medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent) and only
in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus
disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM’s knowledge of
the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also
disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive
proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (dis-
junctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent
distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge
(knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of
proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields
also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not
communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised no-
tions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the
Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Go¨del).
Keywords: agents as proof-checkers; communication networks; construc-
tive Kripke-semantics; disjunctive explicit doxastic & epistemic logic; in-
teractive & oracle computation; interpreted communication; intuitionistic
modal logic; multi-agent distributed systems; proofs as sufficient evidence.
1 Introduction
Subject matter The subject matter of this paper is normal modal logic of
internalised monotonic interactive proofs, i.e., a novel super-intuitionistic nor-
∗Work partially funded with Grant AFR 894328 from the National Research Fund Luxem-
bourg cofunded under the Marie-Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-COFUND)
[Kra13a].
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mal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and mono-
tonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) as well as an existing classical normal modal
logic of internalised classical monotonic (and thus non-disjunctive) interactive
proofs (LiP) [Kra12a, Kra13c]. (We abbreviate interactivity-related adjectives
with lower-case letters.) Recall from [Mos10] that a super-intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic is any consistent collection of propositional formulas that contains
all the axioms of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IL) and that is closed un-
der modus ponens and substitution of arbitrary formulas for proposition letters.
Note however that the language of IL is a strict subset of the (propositionally
modal) language of LIiP.
Goal Our goal here is to produce LIiP axiomatically as well as semantically
from LiP. The process of constructing LIiP from LiP is presented for the sake of
gaining insight into the semantic connection between intuitionistic and classical
interactive proofs, respectively. LIiP, the result of the construction, however is
independent of LiP. Further note that like in [Kra12a], [Kra12c, Kra13c], and
[Kra12b, Kra13b], we still understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence
for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though unable
to guess), and leave probabilistic and polynomial-time resource bounded agents
for future work. Finally note that we choose our meta-logic to be classical
(singleton meta-universe or meta-world unicity, cf. Section 1.1.1).
1.1 Motivation
Our immediate motivation for LIiP is to complete the picture of our above-
mentioned resource-unbounded propositional normal modal logics of interactive
proofs with the missing variant of intuitionistic interactive proofs—see Table 1.
The overarching motivation for LIiP is to serve in an intuitionistic foundation of
interactive computation. See [Kra12a] for a programmatic motivation. Table 1
displays characteristic properties of our interactive proofs as internalised in their
respective resource-unbounded propositional normal modal logic together with
typical applications in information security. The logics themselves, in contrast
to their internalised proof terms, except LIiP are classical, i.e., monotonic and
non-disjunctive (and thus negation-incomplete). As a confirmation, notice that
disjunctivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for intuitionism.
We recall and explain all this logical terminology in the next subsections,
and thereby draw some inspiration from the quite different intuitionistic logic
of intuitionistic non-interactive proofs [AI07] and from the informational views
on modal and intuitionistic logic expressed in [vB97, vB09].
1.1.1 Intuitionistic Logic (IL)
Definition From [Mos10], recall that Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IL)
can be succinctly described as Classical Propositional Logic without the Aris-
totelian law of excluded middle (LEM): (A ∨ ¬A), but with the law of contra-
diction (¬A → (A → B)), and that intuitionistically, Reductio ad absurdum
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only proves negative statements, since (¬¬A→ A) does not hold in general. (If
it did, LEM would follow by modus ponens from the intuitionistically provable
¬¬(A ∨ ¬A).) Semantically, IL (and LIiP) is perhaps best viewed as a modal
logic [Kri65] (cf. Definition 5 and Table 2). Therein,
• the valuation function on atomic propositions is constrained to be mono-
tonic with respect to a partial order on system states (possible worlds);1
• the positive intuitionistic connectives (conjunction, disjunction) are inter-
preted as their classical counterparts (which conserve the monotonicity of
atomic propositions) on the current state;
• the negative intuitionistic connectives (negation, implication) are inter-
preted as their non-monotonic classical counterparts on the upset of the
current state with respect to the partial order (and thus are made to con-
serve the monotonicity of atomic propositions).
Hence first, intuitionistic negation and implication can be viewed as classical
negation and implication prefixed by a (unary) modality that is interpreted by
a (binary) partial-order accessibility relation (e.g., a temporal reachability rela-
tion), respectively; and second, intuitionistic facts, be they positive or negative,
are necessarily monotonic (durable, forward invariant, lasting, persistent, sta-
ble) in the state space [vB09]. (Intuitionistic double negation can be interpreted
temporally as the forward invariant “at some future time.”) Plain classical logic
is also but trivially monotonic, as it can be viewed as a modal logic over a sin-
gleton state space. From this modal viewpoint, one immediately recognises why
(¬¬A→ A) (“true at some future time implies true now”) is valid classically.
Properties In the previous paragraph, we saw that IL has the monotonicity
property (“intuitionistic implies monotonic”). IL has also the important dis-
junction property (“intuitionistic implies disjunctive”). That is, any external
intuitionistic notion of proof `I has the property that `I A∨B implies `I A or
`I B. Recall that disjunctivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for in-
tuitionism, and that plain classical notions of proof do not have the disjunction
property. Now note that when internalised in an object-logical language,
• an external intuitionistic notion of proof, say `I1 , becomes a unary neces-
sity modality, say [M ], parametrised with a proof term M ;
• the disjunction property of `I1 becomes a disjunctive property of the
internalising external notion of proof, say `I2 , that `I2 [M ](φ ∨ φ′) →
([M ]φ ∨ [M ]φ′) ;
1Incidentally, this monotonicity makes intuitionistic logic incompatible with hybrid logic,
whose nominals are atomic propositions true at a single state [AtC07], at least in the basic
case where the intuitionistic-logical universe of worlds coincides with the hybrid-logical one.
For more complex cases, see for example the work of Torben Brau¨ner and Valeria de Paiva.
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• the monotonicity property becomes the similar property that `I2 [M ]φ→
[(M,M ′)]φ, where (M,M ′) is the term pair constructed from M and M ′
with M ′ representing the additional data allowed by the monotonicity.
Further note that a normal modal logic that internalises an intuitionistic notion
of proof is necessarily intuitionistic itself: assume that the external notion of
proof, say `, is classical, i.e., ` φ∨¬φ, and deduce ` [M ](φ∨¬φ) by the normal-
modal rule schema of necessitation that ` φ implies ` [M ]φ . So the internalised
notion of proof [M ] is classical too. Even a non-normal modal logic like [AI07]
must be intuitionistic itself in order to be able to internalise an intuitionistic
notion of proof, because already [AI07]’s weaker form of necessitation—that
`ILP F implies that there is a proof term t such that `ILP t : F—forces external
intuitionism. Finally note that IL is algorithmically decidable [Sta79].
1.1.2 Negation-complete logics
Definition Recall that a notion of proof, say `1, is negation-complete by
definition if and only if `1 A or `1 ¬A. When internalised in an object language
with an external notion of proof, say `2, negation completeness becomes `2
[M ]φ ∨ [M ]¬φ. Though conveniently classical (LEM), negation-complete logics
have also the property of having constructive and computational content.
Properties From the detailed reminder in Section 1.1.1 of [Kra12b, Kra13b],
recall that first, the negation-completeness property implies the discussed dis-
junction property (“negation-complete implies disjunctive”); second, any in-
ternalised negation-complete notion of proof `2 is non-monotonic, that is, `2
[M ]φ∨ [M ]¬φ implies 6`2 [M ]φ→ [(M,M ′)]φ (“negation-complete implies non-
monotonic”); third, negation completeness and intuitionism are incompatible
properties; and fourth, negation completeness implies algorithmic decidability.
1.1.3 Communality
In LDiiP, LiiP, LiP, and LIiP, our so-far ad hoc modal notation [M ]φ becomes
M Ya φ , M ::Ca φ , M :Ca φ , and M ±CM φ , respectively, where a and C is an addi-
tional parameter for a peer-reviewing agent a (such as the as-an-agent-imagined
communication medium CM) and a finite agent-community C of peers, respec-
tively. The intended meaning of these modalities is “M can classically and
disjunctively but only non-monotonically prove to a that φ [is true],” “M can
classically and non-monotonically prove to a that φ and this fact is common
belief in C ∪ {a},” “M can classically and monotonically prove to a that φ and
this fact is common knowledge in C ∪ {a},” and “M can intuitionistically (and
thus disjunctively and monotonically) prove to CM that φ,” respectively. (Recall
from [FHMV95, MV07], that knowledge implies belief.) In all these logics, the
proof potential is such that if my peer reviewer knew my proof then she would
know that its proof goal is true. Notice that what is accepted as a potential
proof M may depend on a community C ∪ {a} of peers if and only if the proof
is non-disjunctive. This is the (non-)communality of M mentioned in Table 1.
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1.2 Contribution
Our contribution in this paper is five-fold:
1. We produce the intuitionistic Logic of Intuitionistic interactive Proofs
(LIiP) (cf. Theorem 3) from its classical counter-part LiP. LIiP internalises
necessarily communication-medium-centred (or communication-adversary-
centred)2 intuitionistic proof theories, enjoying the disjunction property.
As notable syntactic novelties in intuitionistic modal logic, LIiP provides:
(a) a non-primitive
i. possibility modality that is doubly macro-definable within the
language of LIiP: in terms of double negation and
A. communication-medium knowledge (cf. Page 9),
B. its corresponding primitive necessity modality (though not in
the classical modal terms ♦φ↔ ¬¬φ, cf. Theorem 2.58);
ii. necessitation rule that is derivable from the primitive modal
monotonicity axiom schema φ → φ and the primitive modus
ponens deduction rule (cf. Theorem 2.0);
(b) the two insights that in interactive settings,
i. the intuitionistic truths are those of the communication medium
(cf. Remark 2),
ii. intuitionistic proofs induce perfect and thus disjunctive knowl-
edge in the communication medium, and only in that (cf. Re-
mark 3).
That is, we put forward LIiP as a modal-logical characterisation of the
concept of message-passing communication medium.
2. We provide a standard but also oracle-computational and set-theoretically
constructive Kripke-semantics for LIiP (cf. Section 2.2):
• Like in [Kra12c, Kra13c] and [Kra12b, Kra13b], we endow the proof
modality with a standard Kripke-semantics [BvB07], but first de-
fine its accessibility relation MRCM constructively in terms of elemen-
tary set-theoretic constructions,3 namely as MRCM (cf. Section 2.2.1),
and then match it to an abstract semantic interface in standard
form (which abstractly stipulates the characteristic properties of the
accessibility relation [Fit07]). We will say that MRCM exemplifies
(or realises) MRCM (cf. Section 2.2.2). (A simple example of a set-
theoretically constructive but non-intuitionistic definition of a modal
accessibility is the well-known definition of epistemic accessibility
2 In communication security, the communication medium is usually assumed adversarial
(as an agent) and called Eve (the eavesdropper).
3in loose analogy with the set-theoretically constructive rather than the purely axiomatic
definition of numbers [Fef89] or ordered pairs (e.g., the now standard definition by Kuratowski,
and other well-known definitions [Mos06])
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as state indistinguishability defined in terms of equality of state-
projection functions [FHMV95].)
• Our Kripke-semantics is oracle-computational in the sense that the
individual proof knowledge (say M) can be thought of as being pro-
vided by a computation oracle (cf. Definition 3), which thus acts as
a hypothetical provider and imaginary epistemic source of our inter-
active proofs.
As notable semantic novelties in intuitionistic modal logic, LIiP is:
(a) doubly constructive: LIiP is an intuitionistic (and thus constructive)
logic and additionally offers a set-theoretically constructive Kripke-
semantics in the form of the concrete accessibility relation MRCM ;
(b) parametrically mono-relational: We may freely choose between the
abstract accessibility MRCM and its concrete exemplification (or reali-
sation) MRCM as the accessibility relation in LIiP’s Kripke-semantics,
but CMRCM has also the property of being a partial order with CM desig-
nating the communication medium. Hence LIiP’s essentially mono-
relational models subsume seminal bi-relational models of intuitionis-
tic modal logics [Sim94, Page 59] by absorbing the partial order CMRCM
for the Kripke-semantics of LIiP’s intuitionistic connectives as a mere
instance of the accessibility relation MRCM for the Kripke-semantics of
LIiP’s proof modality, thanks to being parametric (and thus generic).
3. We prove a modal-depth result applying both to LIiP’s necessity as well
as its corresponding possibility modality (cf. Corollary 3).
4. We prove that our CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit
refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of
standard S5-knowledge and S4-provability (cf. Corollary 5 and 6).
5. We prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4) and therefrom the
algorithmic decidability of LIiP (cf. Corollary 7).
As a side-effect of our work on LIiP, we offer an internalised, three-line two-axiom
proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (IL) originally proved by
Go¨del. The two axioms are modal internalisations of two fundamental properties
of IL, namely the truthfulness of its proofs and Kripke’s Monotonicity Lemma
for his semantics of IL. Surprisingly, they jointly trivialise the corresponding box
modality ‘’ (though not the one of LIiP) in a technical sense, and thus also, in
a non-technical sense, Go¨del’s (non-trivial) proof of IL’s Disjunction Property.
The truthfulness of intuitionistic proofs corresponds to the well-known modal
T-law φ → φ and Kripke’s Monotonicity Lemma to the law φ → φ (not to
be confused with the mentioned monotonicity of proof terms, cf. Page 4 and
Remark 1). Jointly, they imply (φ ∨ ϕ)→ (φ ∨ϕ) in any modal logic:
1. ` (φ ∨ ϕ)→ (φ ∨ ϕ) T
7
2. ` (φ ∨ ϕ)→ (φ ∨ϕ) ` φ→ φ, ` ϕ→ ϕ, IL
3. ` (φ ∨ ϕ)→ (φ ∨ϕ) 1, 2, IL.
1.3 Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of Intuitionistic interactive Proofs
(LIiP) axiomatically by means of a compact closure operator that induces the
Hilbert-style proof system that we seek. We then prove a substantial number
of useful, deducible structural and logical laws (cf. Theorem 1 and 2) within
the obtained system, and therefrom important corollaries (Corollary 2–6), some
of which count as our aforementioned contributions in this paper. Next, we
introduce the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard abstract
semantic interface for LIiP (cf. Section 2.2), and prove the axiomatic adequacy
of the proof system with respect to this interface (cf. Theorem 3). In the con-
struction of the semantics, we again make use of a closure operator, but this
time on sets of proof terms. Finally, we prove the finite-model property (cf.
Theorem 4) and the algorithmic decidability (cf. Corollary 7) of LDiiP.
2 LIiP
2.1 Syntactically
The Logic of Intuitionistic interactive Proofs (LIiP) provides a modal formula
language over a generic message term language. The formula language offers
the propositional constructors, a relational symbol ‘ k ’ for constructing atomic
propositions about so-called individual knowledge (e.g., a kM), and a modal
constructor ‘± ’ for propositions about proofs (e.g., M ±CM φ). The message
language offers a term constructor for message pairing and can accommodate
arbitrary other term constructors, e.g., for cryptography (cf. [Kra12a]). The sin-
gle term constructor of pairing is sufficient for internalising modus ponens into
the message language (cf. Theorem 2.1) and thus for internalising the single
deduction rule of intuitionistic logic into it. Modus ponens can be regarded as a
minimal requirement for a system to count as a proof system. And so in the con-
text of LIiP, all other term constructors can be regarded as application-specific,
and LIiP-theories with such constructors as applied LIiP-theories. These how-
ever are not the subject matter of our present paper about basic (or pure) LIiP.
(Message signing has no essential role in LIiP as opposed to LiP.) In brief,
LIiP is a minimal modular extension of IL with an interactively generalised
additional operator (the proof modality) and proof-term language (only one,
binary built-in constructor; agents as proof-checkers). Alternatively, LIiP can
be viewed as a refinement (due to its parameterised modality) and extension
(due to additional laws) of Fischer Servi’s [Fis84] or, equivalently, Plotkin and
Stirling’s [PS86] basic intuitionistic modal logic IK, promoted in [Sim94] as “the
true intuitionistic analogue of K.” See [dPR11] for a recent discussion of this
purported truth and alternative contribution in the form of the so-called basic
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constructive modal logic CK, which can be embedded into IK [Ran10]. Note
that the formula language of LIiP is identical to the one of LiP [Kra12a] modulo
the term language and the proof-modality notation. The term language of LIiP
is strictly included in the term language of LiP but may be arbitrarily extended.
The proof-modality notation in LIiP is ‘± ’ whereas it is ‘ : ’ in LiP.
In the sequel, grey-shading indicates essential differences to LiP.
Definition 1 (The language of LIiP). Let
• A designate a finite set of agent names a, b, c, etc. such that CM ∈ A,
where CM designates the communication medium (admissible also in LiP);
• M 3 M ::= a ∣∣ B ∣∣ (M,M) designate our language of message terms M
over A with (transmittable) agent names a ∈ A, application-specific data
B (left blank here), and message-term pairs (M,M) ;
(Messages must be grammatically well-formed, which yields an induction
principle. So agent names a are logical term constants, the meta-variable
B just signals the possibility of an extended term language M, and (·, ·)
is a binary functional symbol. For other term constructors, see [Kra12a].)
• P designate a denumerable set of propositional variables P constrained
such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M, (a kM) ∈ P (for “a knows M”) is a
distinguished variable, i.e., an atomic proposition, (for individual knowl-
edge); (So, for a ∈ A, a k · is a unary relational symbol.)
• L 3 φ ::= P ∣∣ φ∧φ ∣∣ φ∨φ ∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ→ φ ∣∣ M ±CM φ designate our language
of logical formulas φ, where the modal-necessity formula M ±CM φ reads as
“M can intuitionistically prove that φ (is true) to CM.”
Note the following macro-definitions: > := CM k CM, ⊥ := ¬>, φ ↔ φ′ :=
(φ→ φ′) ∧ (φ′ → φ), φ := CM±CM φ (see also Theorem 2.8), ♦φ := ¬¬φ, and
M ∓CM φ := ♦(CM kM ∧ φ) (double negation as modal possibility rather than
necessity, unlike in [Dosˇ84]; see also Theorem 2.58). Recall that whereas con-
junction and disjunction connectives as well as necessitation and possibility
modalities are dually inter-definable in classical modal logic by means of nega-
tion, they are not necessarily so in intuitionistic modal logic [Sim94, Require-
ment 5]. However, as our above macro-definition of M ∓CM φ in terms of a double
negation and individual knowledge foreshadows, M ∓CM φ fortunately is not nec-
essary as a primitive modality in the language of LIiP. ([AI07] remain silent as
to the dual of their intuitionistic-proof modality.)
Then, LIiP has the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas.
Definition 2 (The axioms and deduction rules of LIiP). Let
• Γ0 designate an adequate set of axioms for intuitionistic propositional
logic
• Γ1 := Γ0 ∪ {
9
– a k a (knowledge of one’s own name string)
– (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′) ([un]pairing)
– M ±CM CM kM (self-knowledge)
– (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ′) (K)
– (M ±CM φ)→ (CM kM → φ) (epistemic T, ET)
– (M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ (intuitionistic D, ID)
– φ→M ±CM φ (modal monotonicity, MM) }
designate a set of axiom schemas.
Then, LIiP := Cl(∅) := ⋃n∈N Cln(∅), where for all Γ ⊆ L :
Cl0(Γ) := Γ1 ∪ Γ
Cln+1(Γ) := Cln(Γ) ∪
{ φ′ | {φ, φ→ φ′} ⊆ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (modus ponens, MP)
{ (M ′±CM φ)→M ±CM φ | (CM kM → CM kM ′) ∈ Cln(Γ) }
(epistemic antitonicity, EA).
We call LIiP a base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LIiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
Notice the logical order of LIiP, which like LiP’s is, due to propositions about
(proofs of) propositions, higher-order propositional.
Inherited laws From LiP [Kra12a], we recall the discussion of the (un)pairing
axiom, Kripke’s law (K), the laws of epistemic T (ET) and epistemic antitonicity
(EA): We assume the existence of a pairing mechanism modelling finite sets.
Such a mechanism is required by the important application of communication
(not only cryptographic) protocols [And08, Chapter 3], in which concatenation
of high-level data packets is associative, commutative, and idempotent. The key
to the validity of K is that we understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence
for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though still
unable to guess). Clearly for such agents, if M is sufficient evidence for φ→ φ′
and φ then so is M for φ′. Then, the significance of ET (which as opposed to
the standard T-law is conditioned on individual knowledge) to interactivity is
that in truly distributed multi-agent systems, not all proofs are known by all
agents, i.e., agents are not omniscient with respect to messages. Otherwise, why
communicate with each other? So there being a proof does not imply knowledge
of that proof. When an agent a does not know the proof and the agent cannot
generate the proof ex nihilo herself by guessing it, only communication from a
peer, who thus acts as an oracle, can entail the knowledge of the proof with a.
Finally, note that the law of self-knowledge is a theorem but not an axiom in
LiP, and observe that EA is a rule of logical modularity that allows the modular
generation of structural modal laws from implication term laws (cf. Theorem 1).
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New laws We continue to discuss the new laws of LIiP, which are all axiom
schemas: In contrast to LiP [Kra12a], LIiP must have an intuitionistic rather
than a classical propositional axiom base Γ0 as already explained at the end
of Section 1.1.1. Next, ID says that intuitionistic necessity (“box”) implies
intuitionistic possibility (“diamond”). As opposed to its classical-modal-logic
equivalent D, ID cannot be alternatively stated in the shape of ` φ→ ¬¬φ.
Then, the law of modal monotonicity MM reflects the semantic fact mentioned
in Section 1.2 that LIiP’s Kripke-model absorbs the partial order for the Kripke-
semantics of LIiP’s intuitionistic connectives as a mere instance of the accessi-
bility relation for the Kripke-semantics of LIiP’s proof modality, thanks to being
parametric (and thus generic, cf. Section 2.2). Thus we adopt formulas of the
shape φ → φ as axioms MM in our intuitionistic modal logical system LIiP,
like Dosˇen in his intuitionistic modal logical system Hdn [Dosˇ84], where he
adopts formulas of that form as axioms dn2. To our knowledge, Hdn and LIiP
are the only intuitionistic modal logics with such axioms. Finally, we could add
admissible but not derivable rules and their corresponding internalising axioms
to LIiP in the style of [AI07]. (Recall from [Mos10] that the admissible rules
of a theory are the rules under which the theory is closed. Hence the set of
primitive and derivable rules is a subset of the set of admissible rules, and [but
not] vice versa in classical [intuitionistic] logic. [IL is structurally incomplete.]
See [Jerˇ08] for suitable bases of admissible rules.) However, since the addition
of admissible but not derivable rules to a theory does not change the theory,
such an addition can be considered as unnecessary, at least in our base theory.
In the sequel, “:iff” abbreviates “by definition, if and only if”.
Proposition 1 (Hilbert-style proof system). Let
• Φ `LIiP φ :iff if Φ ⊆ LIiP then φ ∈ LIiP
• φ a`LIiP φ′ :iff {φ} `LIiP φ′ and {φ′} `LIiP φ
• `LIiP φ :iff ∅ `LIiP φ.
In other words, `LIiP ⊆ 2L×L is a system of closure conditions in the sense of
[Tay99, Definition 3.7.4]. For example:
1. for all axioms φ ∈ Γ1, `LIiP φ
2. for modus ponens, {φ, φ→ φ′} `LIiP φ′
3. for epistemic antitonicity,
{CM kM → CM kM ′} `LIiP (M ′±CM φ)→M ±CM φ.
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation “Φ `LIiP φ”, Φ is not a set of
hypotheses but a set of premises, cf. modus ponens and epistemic antitonicity.)
Then, `LIiP can be viewed as being defined by a Cl-induced Hilbert-style
proof system. In fact Cl : 2L → 2L is a standard consequence operator, i.e., a
substitution-invariant compact closure operator.
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Proof. Like in [Kra12a]. That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as
induced by a compact closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [Gab95]); that
Cl is indeed such an operator can be verified by inspection of the inductive
definition of Cl; and substitution invariance follows from our definitional use of
axiom schemas.4
Corollary 1 (Normality). LIiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. Jointly by Kripke’s law and modus ponens (by definition), necessitation
(cf. proof of Theorem 2.0), and substitution invariance (cf. Proposition 1).
We are now going to present some useful deducible structural laws of LIiP, in-
cluding the deducible non-structural rule of epistemic bitonicity, used in the de-
duction of some of them. Here, “structural” means “deducible exclusively from
term axioms.” The laws are enumerated in a (total) order that respects (but
cannot reflect) their respective proof prerequisites. The laws are also deducible
in LiP, in the same order and without non-intuitionistic machinery [Kra12a].
Theorem 1 (Some useful deducible structural laws).
1. `LIiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM
(left projection, 1-way K-combinator property)
2. `LIiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM ′ (right projection)
3. `LIiP a k (M,M)↔ a kM (pairing idempotency)
4. `LIiP a k (M,M ′)↔ a k (M ′,M) (pairing commutativity)
5. `LIiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM)
(neutral pair elements)
6. `LIiP a k (M,a)↔ a kM (self-neutral pair element)
7. `LIiP a k (M, (M ′,M ′′))↔ a k ((M,M ′),M ′′) (pairing associativity)
8. {CM kM ↔ CM kM ′} `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ′±CM φ (epistemic bitonicity)
9. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→ (M ′,M)±CM φ (proof extension, left)
10. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→ (M,M ′)±CM φ (proof extension, right)
11. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ′±CM φ)→ (M,M ′)±CM φ (proof extension)
12. `LIiP ((M,M)±CM φ)↔M ±CM φ (proof idempotency)
13. `LIiP ((M,M ′)±CM φ)↔ (M ′,M)±CM φ (proof commutativity)
14. {CM kM → CM kM ′} `LIiP ((M,M ′)±CM φ)↔M ±CM φ
(neutral proof elements)
4Alternatively to axiom schemas, we could have used axioms together with an additional
substitution-rule set { σ[φ] | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } in the definiens of Cln+1(Γ).
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15. `LIiP ((M, CM)±CM φ)↔M ±CM φ (self-neutral proof element)
16. `LIiP ((M, (M ′,M ′′))±CM φ)↔ ((M,M ′),M ′′)±CM φ
(proof associativity)
Proof. Like in [Kra12a]—no non-intuitionistic machinery is required.
For a discussion of these LIiP laws, consider our discussion of their analogs in
LiP [Kra12a] and the following remark.
Remark 1 (Monotonicity—Proof & Truth). The law of proof extension cap-
tures the monotonicity of the proof terms in LIiP mentioned in Table 1, as does
its analog in LiP. In contrast, the law of modal monotonicity (cf. Definition 2),
which does not hold in LiP, captures the monotonicity of the local truths in
LIiP. Recall from Section 1 that in an intuitionistic (modal) universe (such as
LIiP’s), all, i.e., positive or negative (whence the notation ‘±CM’), (local) truths
are monotonic. Whereas in a classical (modal) universe (such as LiP’s), not all
(local) truths need be monotonic. If a proof term is monotonic then its proof
goal is. If a proof goal is monotonic then its proof must be. In LIiP, all proof
goals are monotonic, thanks to LIiP being intuitionistic, which is what forces
them to be so. However in LiP, not all proof goals need be monotonic, because
of LiP being classical as well as modal, which is what frees them from being so.
Corollary 2 (S-combinator property).
1. `LIiP a k ((M,M ′),M ′′)↔ a k (M, (M ′′, (M ′,M ′′)))
2. `LIiP (((M,M ′),M ′′)±CM φ)↔ (M, (M ′′, (M ′,M ′′)))±CM φ
Proof. Like in [Kra12a]—again, no non-intuitionistic machinery is required.
We are going to present also some useful, deducible logical laws of LIiP.
Here, “logical” means “not structural” in the previously defined sense. Also
these laws are enumerated in an order that respects their respective proof pre-
requisites. Grey-shading indicates special interest for intuitionistic modal logic
in general and for LIiP as opposed to (the classical) LiP in particular. Three
important themes therein are: first, intuitionistic negation (single ‘¬’ and dou-
ble ‘¬¬’) and second, individual knowledge (CM kM), and their import for the
relation between M ±CM φ and its dual M ∓CM φ, which is normally not one of
identity nor dual definability in intuitionistic modal logic; and third, the inter-
nalised disjunction property (IDP), which does not hold in LiP. ([AI07] remain
silent about the deducibility of an IDP in their logic, which, given that they
internalise standard IL, is intriguing.) Theorem 2 has four important corollar-
ies, among which there is a modal-depth result, the relation of LIiP to Fischer
Servi’s [Fis84] and Plotkin and Stirling’s [PS86] seminal work on intuitionistic
modal logic, and the relation of LIiP to standard doxastic [MV07] and epistemic
logic [MV07, FHMV95, HR10]. The number of intermediate results required to
obtain the corollaries, reflected in the length of Theorem 2, may be indicative
of the exponential blow-up in proof length of intuitionistic over classical logic
13
[Hru07]. The non-intuitionistically inclined reader may want to skip them ex-
cept Theorem 2.58. Whereas the intuitionistically inclined reader may want to
prove them herself, in order and as milestones for proving their corollaries.
Theorem 2 (Some useful deducible logical laws).
0. {φ} `LIiP M ±CM φ (necessitation, N)
1. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ′±CM φ)→ (M,M ′)±CM φ′)
(generalised Kripke-law, GK)
2. {φ→ φ′} `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ′ (regularity, R)
3. {φ↔ φ′} `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM φ′ (R bis)
4. {CM kM → CM kM ′, φ→ φ′} `LIiP (M ′±CM φ)→M ±CM φ′
(epistemic regularity, ER)
5. {CM kM ↔ CM kM ′, φ↔ φ′} `LIiP (M ′±CM φ)↔M ±CM φ′ (ER bis)
6. `LIiP M ±CM> (anything can prove tautological truth)
7. `LIiP M ∓CM> (anything can disprove tautological falsehood)
8. `LIiP φ↔ φ (TMM)
9. φ a`LIiP φ (TMM bis)
10. `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) (ET bis)
11. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM) (CM message communicability, CMMC)
12. `LIiP ¬¬((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) (possible TMM, PTMM)
13. `LIiP ¬φ→ ¬(M ∓CM φ)
(falsehood implies falsehood non-disprovability, FIFND)
14. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬(M ±CM φ)
(falsehood non-disprovability equals truth unprovability, FNDETU)
15. `LIiP ¬φ→ ¬(M ±CM φ)
(falsehood implies truth unprovability, FITU)
16. `LIiP ¬¬φ→ ¬(M ∓CM ¬φ) (FIFND bis)
17. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM ¬φ)↔ ¬(M ±CM ¬φ) (FNDETU bis)
18. `LIiP ¬¬φ→ ¬(M ±CM ¬φ) (FITU bis)
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19. `LIiP(φ ∨ (M ±CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ)→
(¬¬φ ∧ ¬(M ∓CM ¬φ) ∧ ¬(M ±CM ¬φ))
(extended weak double-negation law, EWDN)
20. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ′)→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)
(conditional functionality, CF)
21. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ)→ ((M ∓CM φ)↔M ±CM φ)
(local classicality implies modal equivalence, LCIME)
22. `LIiP (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ)→ (¬¬φ→ φ)
(proof knowledge implies local classicality, PKILC)
23. `LIiP (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ)→ ((M ∓CM φ)↔M ±CM φ)
(proof knowledge implies modal equivalence, PKIME)
24. `LIiP ¬(M ±CM⊥) (nothing can prove tautological falsehood)
25. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM⊥) (nothing can disprove tautological truth)
26. `LIiP φ→M ∓CM φ (weak MM, WMM)
27. {CM kM → φ} a`LIiP M ±CM φ (epistemic N, EN)
28. {CM kM → CM kM ′} a`LIiP M ±CM CM kM ′ (EN bis)
29. `LIiP M ±CM ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) (ET bis self-proof)
30. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ±CM (M ±CM φ) (4)
31. `LIiP ¬(M ±CM φ)→M ±CM ¬(M ±CM φ) (5)
32. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∧M ′±CM φ′)→ (M,M ′)±CM (φ ∧ φ′)
(proof conjunctions)
33. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ)∧M ±CM φ′)↔M ±CM (φ∧φ′) (proof conjunctions bis)
34. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ)∨M ′±CM φ′)→ (M,M ′)±CM (φ∨φ′) (proof disjunctions)
35. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′)→M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′) (proof disjunctions bis)
36. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ±CM φ))↔M ±CM φ (modal idempotency, MI)
37. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ (MI bis)
38. `LIiP (φ ∨ (M ±CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ)
(nested MM, NMM)
39. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) (modal swap, MS)
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40. `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′))
(epistemic internalised disjunction property, EIDP)
41. `LIiP M ±CM ((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′))
(IDP self-proof)
42. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ) (epistemic idempotency, EI)
43. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) (EI bis)
44. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M ∓CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ′)
(Plotkin-Stirling 4, PS4)
45. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM φ′)
(Plotkin-Stirling 2, PS2)
46. `LIiP ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)→M ±CM (φ→ φ′)
(Plotkin-Stirling 5, PS5)
47. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ′)→M ±CM (φ→ φ′) (CFPS5)
48. `LIiP((¬¬φ→ φ′) ∧ (¬¬φ′ → φ))→
((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′))
(conditional IDP, CIDP)
49. `LIiP (φ ∨ (M ±CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) (NMM bis)
50. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ±CM φ))→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) (MS bis)
51. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM (M ±CM φ)
(modal commutativity, MC)
52. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ±CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ
(mixed modal idempotency, MMI)
53. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ (MMI bis)
54. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ∓CM φ (double-negation absorption, DNA)
55. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) (double-negation extrusion, DNE)
56. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM ¬φ (weak negation completeness, WNC)
57. `LIiP ¬(M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM ¬φ (WNC bis)
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58. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) (modal double negation, MDN)
59. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∧M ∓CM (φ→ φ′))→M ∓CM φ (Wiv)
60. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∧ ¬φ′))→ (φ ∧ ¬φ′) (Wv)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The following remark flags a non-trivial insight, also explicated in Section 2.2.
Remark 2 (Intuitionistic truths). Theorem 2.8 means that in interactive set-
tings, the intuitionistic truths are those of the communication medium.
The reader is invited to compare Theorem 2.8 to its global counterpart Theo-
rem 2.27, whose analog also holds in LiP but was not stated there.
Corollary 3 (Modal-depth result). Let ♥1 · · · ♥nφ ∈ L such that for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n, ♥i ∈ {‘M ±CM’ , ‘M ∓CM’ }. Then, if the prefix ‘♥1 · · · ♥n’ contains
1. only occurrences of the ‘M ±CM’-modality then
`LIiP (♥1 · · · ♥nφ)↔M ±CM φ ;
2. at least one occurrence of the ‘M ∓CM’-modality then
`LIiP (♥1 · · · ♥nφ)↔M ∓CM φ .
Proof. For 1, apply MI. For 2, apply MI, MI bis, MMI, and MMI bis.
Corollary 4 (Intuitionistic Modal Logic). LIiP is a refinement (due to its pa-
rameterised modality) and extension (due to additional laws) of Fischer Servi’s
[Fis84] and Plotkin and Stirling’s [PS86] intuitionistic modal logic IK.
Similarly is LIiP a refinement and extension of the propositional fragment of
Wijesekera’s system of first-order constructive modal logic [Wij90, Section 1.5].
Proof. In fact, Plotkin and Stirling’s axiomatisation of IK, which is equivalent
to Fischer Servi’s, consists of the axioms of IL and the laws K, MP, N as well
as the axiom analogs of Theorem 2.25 and 2.44–2.46; and the propositional
fragment of Wijesekera’s system consists of the axioms of IL and the laws K,
MP, N as well as the axiom analogs of Theorem 2.45, 2.59 and 2.60.
The following corollary asserts that our disjunctive proof modality is also an
explicit refinement of the standard (implicit) belief modality [MV07].
Corollary 5 (Disjunctive Explicit Belief). ‘M ±CM ·’ is a disjunctive KD45-
modality of explicit agent belief, where M represents the explicit evidence term
that can justify the agent CM’s belief. Additionally, the communication medium
CM is a truth-believing agent in the sense that `LIiP φ→M ±CM φ.
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Proof. Consider that ‘M ±CM ·’ satisfies the K-law (cf. Definition 2), the D-law
(called ID in Definition 2), the 4-law (cf. Theorem 2.30), the 5-law (cf. The-
orem 2.31), IDP self-proof (cf. Theorem 2.41), the MM-law (cf. Definition 2),
and the N-law (cf. Theorem 2.0).
Thanks to Theorem 2.10, CM kM is a sufficient condition for ‘M ±CM ·’ to
behave like a standard S5-modality of perfect knowledge (in a technical sense)
[MV07, FHMV95, HR10], which in addition to being a KD45-modality not only
obeys the D-law but also the stronger T-law (knowledge, not only belief) and
the MM-law (perfect knowledge):
`LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ).
Remark 3 (Perfect knowledge). In interactive settings, only the communica-
tion medium CM, through which all messages have to pass, can attain perfect
knowledge (the other agents having only partial visibility of the network, cf. Def-
inition 3). However note that LIiP being propositionally modal-intuitionistic,
this perfect knowledge is of propositional invariants of the communication net-
work only (cf. Page 4). So the epistemic perfection of the communication
medium is only within a certain grain (propositional) and scope (invariants).
In the following corollary, we construct also a disjunctive explicit refinement
of (implicit) S4-provability.
Corollary 6 (Disjunctive Explicit Provability). ‘ CM kM∧M ±CM ·’ is a disjunc-
tive S4-modality of explicit agent provability, where M represents the explicit
evidence term that does justify agent CM’s knowledge.
Proof. By Corollary 5, Theorem 2.10, and Theorem 2.40: The T-law `LDiiP
(CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) → φ for the modality ‘CM kM ∧M ±CM ·’ can be recognised
by inspecting Theorem 2.10, and the disjunctivity `LDiiP (CM kM ∧M ±CM (φ ∨
φ′))→ ((CM kM ∧M ±CM φ)∨ (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ′)) by inspecting Theorem 2.40.
2.2 Semantically
We continue to present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the
standard abstract semantic interface for LIiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy
of the proof system with respect to this interface. The core ingredient of the
concrete semantics of LIiP are so-called input histories, which were introduced in
[Kra12b, Kra13b] and could also be used in an even more concrete semantics of
LiP. Input histories are finite words of input events and serve as concrete states
s ∈ S in the state space S, on which the concrete and abstract accessibility
relation MRCM ⊆ S ×S and MRCM ⊆ S ×S for LIiP is defined, respectively. The
reader of [Kra12a, Kra13c] will recognise similar but simpler definitions here;
the one of MRCM could be even simpler (cf. Fact 1.2), but is as now in order to
allow for a simpler, pattern-matching comparison with the corresponding one
in [Kra12a, Kra13c]. (We wanted to show how to produce LIiP from LiP.)
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2.2.1 Concretely
Definition 3 (Semantic ingredients). For the set-theoretically constructive,
model-theoretic study of LIiP let
• S 3 s ::= 0 ∣∣ succMa (s) designate the concrete state space S of input
histories s, where 0 designates the empty input history (i.e., a zero data
point, e.g., an initial state) and succMa can be read as “agent a receives
message M” (e.g., from some other agent acting as an oracle for a); and
? : (S × S)→ S monoidal concatenation on S (with neutral element 0);
• pia : S → S designate (local) state projection on a’s view such that
pia(0) := 0
pia(succ
M
b (s)) :=
{
succMb (pia(s)) if a ∈ {b, CM}, and
pia(s) otherwise;
(The communication medium CM sees any agent’s b [including its own]
input events, i.e., CM has a global view on the current global state s.)
• msgs : S → 2M designate raw-data extraction such that
msgs(0) := ∅
msgs(succMa (s)) := msgs(s) ∪ {M} ;
• msgsa := msgs ◦ pia designate (local) raw-data extraction by a ;
• clsa : 2M → 2M designate a data-mining operator such that clsa(D) :=
cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=
⋃
n∈N cl
n
a(msgsa(s) ∪ D), where for all D ⊆M :
cl0a(D) := {a} ∪ D
cln+1a (D) := clna(D) ∪
{ (M,M ′) | {M,M ′} ⊆ clna(D) } ∪ (pairing)
{ M,M ′ | (M,M ′) ∈ clna(D) } (unpairing)
(clsa(∅) can be viewed as a’s individual-knowledge base in s. For application-
specific terms such as signing and encryption, we would have to add here
the closure conditions corresponding to their characteristic term axioms.)
• va ⊆ S × S designate the (local) state pre-order of a such that for all
s, s′ ∈ S, s va s′ :iff there is s′′ ∈ S such that pia(s) ? pia(s′′) = pia(s′) ;
• v := vCM designate the (global) state partial order serving as the concrete
accessibility relation in the Kripke-semantics for the I-fragment of LIiP;
(v is partial thanks to CM seeing any agent’s input events.)
• ≡a := va ∩ (va)−1 designate the (local) state equivalence of a;
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• MRCM ⊆ S × S designate the concretely constructed accessibility rela-
tion—short, concrete accessibility—for LIiP such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MRCM s
′ :iff s′ ∈
⋃
s vCM s˜ and
M ∈ cls˜CM(∅)
[s˜]≡CM
(iff there is s˜ ∈ S s.t. s vCM s˜ and M ∈ cls˜CM(∅) and s˜ ≡CM s′).
Note that the data-mining operator cla : 2
M → 2M is a compact closure
operator, which induces a data-derivation relation `a ⊆ 2M × M such that
D `a M :iffM ∈ cla(D), which (1) has the compactness and (2) the cut property,
(3) is decidable in deterministic polynomial time in the size of D and M , and
(4) induces a Scott information system of information tokens M [Kra12a].
Fact 1.
1. ≡CM = IdS
2. s MRCM s
′ if and only if (s v s′ and M ∈ cls′CM(∅))
3. CMRCM = v
Proof. By inspection of definitions.
Fact 1.1 is important, because thanks to it the communication medium CM can
have perfect knowledge, as asserted on Page 18; and Fact 1.3 is, because thanks
to it the partial order v for the Kripke-semantics of LIiP’s intuitionistic connec-
tives is absorbed as a mere instance CMRCM of the accessibility relation MRCM for
the Kripke-semantics of LIiP’s proof modality, as announced on Page 7. Fact 1.2
captures the intuition of the concrete accessibility of LIiP. Spelled out, this in-
tuition is that CM can access an input history s′ from the current input history
s with respect to a piece of data M in question if and only if s′ is an extension
of s such that M is in CM’s individual-knowledge base at s′. A simple example
is that 0 CMRM succ
M
a (0), because 0 v succMa (0) and M ∈ clsucc
M
a (0)
CM (∅). A
slightly more complex example is that 0 CMRM ′ succ
(M,M ′)
b (succ
M
a (0)), because
0 v succ(M,M ′)b (succMa (0)) and M ′ ∈ cl
succ
(M,M′)
b (succ
M
a (0))
CM (∅).
We need the following auxiliary definition for the proposition following it.
Definition 4 (Message pre-ordering [Kra12a, Kra13c]).
• M vsa M ′ :iff if M ∈ clsa(∅) then M ′ ∈ clsa(∅)
• M va M ′ :iff for all s ∈ S, M vsa M ′
Notice the definitional overloading of the notation va, i.e., once as va ⊆ S ×S
in Definition 3 and once as va ⊆M×M in the previous Definition 4.
Proposition 2 (Concrete accessibility).
20
Table 2: Satisfaction relation
(S,V), s |= P :iff s ∈ V(P )
(S,V), s |= φ ∨ φ′ :iff (S,V), s |= φ or (S,V), s |= φ′
(S,V), s |= φ ∧ φ′ :iff (S,V), s |= φ and (S,V), s |= φ′
(S,V), s |= ¬φ :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s v s′ then not (S,V), s′ |= φ
(S,V), s |= φ→ φ′ :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s v s′ then (not (S,V), s
′ |= φ
or (S,V), s′ |= φ′)
(S,V), s |= M ±CM φ :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s MRCM s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ
1. If s MRCM s
′ then M ∈ cls′CM(∅) (epistemic image)
2. If M ∈ clsCM(∅) then s MRCM s (conditional reflexivity)
3. there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCM s′ (seriality)
4. MRCM ⊆ CMRCM = v (MIAR-inclusion)
5. (CMRCM ◦MRCM) ⊆ MRCM (special transitivity)
6. If M vCM M ′ then MRCM ⊆ M ′RCM (proof monotonicity)
Proof. For 1, inspect Fact 1.2. For 2, inspect Fact 1.2 and 1.3 and the definition
of v (to see that v is reflexive). For 3, inspect Fact 1.2 and let s ∈ S. Then
choose s′ = succMCM (s) ∈ S, which implies that s v s′ and M ∈ cls
′
CM(∅). For 4,
inspect Fact 1.2 and 1.3 and the definitional fact that CM ∈ cls′CM(∅). For 5, let
s, s′ ∈ S and suppose that s (CMRCM ◦MRCM) s′. That is, there is s′′ ∈ S such that
s CMRCM s
′′ and s′′ MRCM s
′. Hence, s v s′′ and CM ∈ cls′′CM (∅) as well as s′′ v s′
and M ∈ cls′CM(∅), by Fact 1.2. Hence s v s′ by the transitivity of v. Hence
s MRCM s
′ by Fact 1.2. For 6, let M,M ′ ∈ M and suppose that M vCM M ′.
Further, let s, s′ ∈ S and suppose that s MRCM s′. Hence M vs
′
CM M
′, and also
s v s′ and M ∈ cls′CM(∅) by Fact 1.2. Hence M ′ ∈ cls
′
CM(∅). Hence s M ′RCM s′ by
Fact 1.2.
Note that “MIAR” stands for “modal-intuitionistic-accessibility-relation.”
2.2.2 Abstractly
Definition 5 (Kripke-model). We define the satisfaction relation |= for LIiP
in Table 2, where
• V : P → 2S designates a usual valuation function, yet
– partially predefined such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈M,
V(a kM) := { s ∈ S | M ∈ clsa(∅) } ;
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(If agents are Turing-machines then a knowing M can be understood
as a being able to parse M on its tape.)
– constrained such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
if s ∈ V(P ) and s v s′ then s′ ∈ V(P ) ;
(following Kripke’s semantics for IL)
• S := (S,v, {MRCM}M∈M) designates an intuitionistic modal frame for
LIiP with a usual partial order v ⊆ S × S for the intuitionistic part as
well as an abstractly constrained accessibility relation—short, abstract
accessibility—MRCM ⊆ S × S for LIiP such that—the semantic interface:
– If s MRCM s′ then M ∈ cls
′
CM(∅)
– If M ∈ clsCM(∅) then s MRCM s
– there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCM s′
– MRCM ⊆ CMRCM = v
– (CMRCM ◦MRCM) ⊆ MRCM
– If M vCM M ′ then MRCM ⊆ M ′RCM
• (S,V) designates an intuitionistic modal model for LIiP.
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 2 actually establishes the important
fact that our concrete accessibility MRCM in Definition 3 realises all the properties
stipulated by our abstract accessibility MRCM in Definition 5; we say that
MRCM exemplifies (or realises) MRCM .
Further, observe that LIiP (like LiP) has a Herbrand-style semantics, i.e., logi-
cal constants (agent names) and functional symbols (pairing) are self-interpreted
rather than interpreted in terms of (other, semantic) constants and functions.
This simplifying design choice spares our framework from the additional com-
plexity that would arise from term-variable assignments [BG07], which in turn
keeps our models propositionally modal. Our choice is admissible because our
individuals (messages) are finite. (Infinitely long “messages” are non-messages;
they can never be completely received, e.g., transmitting irrational numbers as
such is impossible.)
Definition 6 (Truth & Validity [BvB07]).
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisfied) in the model (S,V) at the state
s ∈ S :iff (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable in the model (S,V) :iff there is s ∈ S such
that (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisfied) in the model (S,V),
written (S,V) |= φ, :iff for all s ∈ S, (S,V), s |= φ.
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• The formula φ is satisfiable :iff there is a model (S,V) and a state s ∈ S
such that (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is valid, written |= φ, :iff for all models (S,V), (S,V) |= φ.
The following lemma is a passage oblige´ in the construction of a Kripke-semantics
for any intuitionistic logic, modal or not, and thus also for ours.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity Lemma). For all LIiP-models (S,V), s, s′ ∈ S, and
φ ∈ L, if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ then (S,V), s′ |= φ.
Proof. Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LIiP-model and let s, s′ ∈ S. Then let
us proceed by induction on the structure of φ ∈ L :
• Base case (φ := P for an arbitrary P ∈ P ⊆ L). Suppose that s v s′ and
(S,V), s |= P . Thus s ∈ V(P ), by definition. Hence s′ ∈ V(P ), by the
definitional constraint on V. Thus (S,V), s′ |= P , by definition.
• Inductive steps:
– φ := φ′ ∨ φ′′ for arbitrary φ′, φ′′ ∈ L. For the sake of the induction,
suppose that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′ and
that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′′. Further
suppose that s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ ∨ φ′′. Thus (S,V), s |= φ′
or (S,V), s |= φ′′, by definition. Let us proceed by disjunctive case
analysis:
∗ Suppose that (S,V), s |= φ′. Hence (S,V), s′ |= φ′, by induction
hypothesis. Hence (S,V), s′ |= φ′ or (S,V), s′ |= φ′′, by meta-
level (classical) propositional logic. Thus (S,V), s′ |= φ′∨φ′′, by
definition.
∗ Suppose that (S,V), s |= φ′′, and proceed symmetrically to the
previous case.
– φ := φ′ ∧ φ′′ for arbitrary φ′, φ′′ ∈ L. For the sake of the induction,
suppose that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′ and
that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′′. Further
suppose that s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ ∧φ′′. Thus (S,V), s |= φ′ and
(S,V), s |= φ′′, by definition. Hence (S,V), s′ |= φ′ and (S,V), s′ |=
φ′′, by the induction hypotheses. Thus (S,V), s′ |= φ′ ∧ φ′′, by
definition.
– φ := ¬φ′ for an arbitrary φ′ ∈ L. For the sake of the induction,
suppose that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′. Further
suppose that s v s′ and (S,V), s |= ¬φ′. Thus for all s′′ ∈ S, if
s v s′′ then not (S,V), s′′ |= φ′, by definition. Now, let s′′ ∈ S and
further suppose that s′ v s′′. Hence s v s′′, by the transitivity of v.
Hence not (S,V), s′′ |= φ′. Hence for all s′′ ∈ S, if s′ v s′′ then not
(S,V), s′′ |= φ′. Thus (S,V), s′ |= ¬φ′, by definition. (Observe that
the induction hypothesis turns out to be irrelevant for this case.)
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– φ := φ′ → φ′′ for arbitrary φ′, φ′′ ∈ L. For the sake of the induction,
suppose that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′ and
that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′′. Further
suppose that s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ → φ′′. Thus for all s′′ ∈ S, if
s v s′′ then (not (S,V), s′′ |= φ′ or (S,V), s′′ |= φ′′), by definition.
Now, let s′′ ∈ S and further suppose that s′ v s′′. Hence s v s′′,
by the transitivity of v. Hence, not (S,V), s′′ |= φ′ or (S,V), s′′ |=
φ′′. Hence for all s′′ ∈ S, if s′ v s′′ then (not (S,V), s′′ |= φ′ or
(S,V), s′′ |= φ′′). Thus (S,V), s′ |= φ′ → φ′′, by definition. (Observe
that the induction hypotheses turn out to be irrelevant for this case.)
– φ := M ±CM φ′ for an arbitrary φ′ ∈ L. For the sake of the induction,
suppose that if s v s′ and (S,V), s |= φ′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ′. Further
suppose that s v s′ and (S,V), s |= M ±CM φ′. Thus on the one hand,
s CMRCM s′, by MIAR-inclusion, and also, on the other hand, for all
s′′ ∈ S, if s MRCM s′′ then (S,V), s′′ |= φ′, by definition. Now, let
s′′ ∈ S and further suppose that s′ MRCM s′′. Hence s MRCM s′′,
by special transitivity. Hence (S,V), s′′ |= φ′. (Observe that the
induction hypothesis turns out to be irrelevant for this case.)
Observe that the induction hypothesis in the proof turns out to be irrelevant
for all negative connectives and the modality, which are made to conserve the
monotonicity of atomic propositions (cf. Page 4).
Proposition 3 (Concrete LIiP-models). LetM designate an arbitrary concrete
LIiP-model, i.e., a model with ingredients like in Definition 3, and let φ ∈ L.
Then,
M, 0 |= φ if and only if M |= φ .
Proof. The only-if direction follows from the definition of global satisfaction
(cf. Definition 6). For the if-direction, consider that the concrete state space
S = { s ∈ S | 0 v s } and apply the antecedent Monotonicity Lemma.
Proposition 4 (Admissibility of LIiP-specific axioms and rules).
1. |= a k a
2. |= (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′)
3. |= M ±CM CM kM
4. |= (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)
5. |= (M ±CM φ)→ (CM kM → φ)
6. |= (M ±CM φ)→ (M ∓CM φ)
7. |= φ→M ±CM φ
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8. If |= φ then |= M ±CM φ
9. If |= CM kM → CM kM ′ then |= (M ′±CM φ)→M ±CM φ.
Proof. 1 and 2 are immediate; 4 and 8 hold by the fact that LIiP has a standard
Kripke-semantics; 3 follows directly from the epistemic-image property of MRCM,
5 from the conditional reflexivity of MRCM, and 9 from the proof-monotonicity
property of MRCM. 6 follows from the seriality of MRCM and the MIAR-inclusion
and the epistemic-image property of MRCM as follows: Let (S,V) designate an
arbitrary LIiP-model and let s ∈ S. Further let s′ ∈ S and suppose that s v s′.
Now suppose that (S,V), s′ |= M ±CM φ. Further let s′′ ∈ S and suppose that
s′ v s′′. Hence (S,V), s′′ |= M ±CM φ by the Monotonicity Lemma. That is, for
all s′′′ ∈ S, if s′′ MRCM s′′′ then (S,V), s′′′ |= φ. But by the seriality of MRCM,
there is indeed an s′′′ ∈ S such that s′′ MRCM s′′′. Hence, (S,V), s′′′ |= φ, and
also s′′ v s′′′ by the MIAR-inclusion property, and yet also M ∈ cls′′′CM (∅) by the
epistemic-image property. Thus (S,V), s′′′ |= CM kM ∧ φ. Hence (S,V), s′ |=
¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) and thus (S,V), s |= (M ±CM φ) → ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ). Finally, 7
follows from the MIAR-inclusion property of MRCM and the Monotonicity Lemma
(which in turn holds thanks to the special transitivity and the MIAR-inclusion
property of MRCM) as follows: Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LIiP-model and
let s ∈ S. Further let s′ ∈ S and suppose that s v s′. Now suppose that
(S,V), s′ |= φ. Additionally, let s′′ ∈ S and suppose that s′ MRCM s′′. Hence
s′ v s′′ by MIAR-inclusion. Hence (S,V), s′′ |= φ by the Monotonicity Lemma.
Thus, (S,V), s′ |= M ±CM φ, and then (S,V), s |= φ→M ±CM φ.
Theorem 3 (Axiomatic adequacy). `LIiP is adequate for |=, i.e.,:
1. if `LIiP φ then |= φ (axiomatic soundness)
2. if |= φ then `LIiP φ (semantic completeness).
Proof. Both parts can be proved with standard means: axiomatic soundness
follows from the admissibility of the axioms and rules (cf. Propostion 4) as
usual, and semantic completeness follows by means of a construction of canonical
models that is appropriate for intuitionistic normal modal logic as follows.
Let
• W designate the set of all prime LIiP-consistent sets5
• w v w′ :iff w ⊆ w′
• for all w,w′ ∈ W, w MCCM w′ :iff { φ ∈ L | M ±CM φ ∈ w } ⊆ w′
5* A set W of LIiP-formulas is prime LIiP-consistent :iff W is LIiP-consistent and W is
prime. A set W of LIiP-formulas is LIiP-consistent :iff W is not LIiP-inconsistent. A set
W of LIiP-formulas is LIiP-inconsistent :iff there is a finite W ′ ⊆ W such that ((∧W ′) →
⊥) ∈ LIiP. A set W of LIiP-formulas is prime :iff first, W is deductively closed, that is,
there is a finite W ′ ⊆ W such that for all φ ∈ L, if ((∧W ′) → φ) ∈ LIiP then φ ∈ W , and
second, W has the disjunction property, that is, for all φ, φ′ ∈ L, if φ∨φ′ ∈W then φ ∈W or
φ′ ∈W . Similar to a classical Lindenbaum construction (extending consistent sets to maximal
consistent sets) any LIiP-consistent set can be extended to a prime LIiP-consistent set.
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• for all w ∈ W, w ∈ VC(P ) :iff P ∈ w.
Then MC := (W,v, {MCCM}M∈M,VC) designates the canonical model for LIiP.
Following standard practice common to all intuitionistic normal modal log-
ics, the following useful property of MC, the so-called Truth Lemma,
for all φ ∈ L and w ∈ W, φ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ
can be proved by induction on the structure of φ. With this lemma, it can then
be proved that for all φ ∈ L, if 6`LIiP φ then 6|= φ. Let φ ∈ L, and suppose
that 6`LIiP φ. Thus, {¬φ} is LIiP-consistent, and can be extended to a prime
LIiP-consistent set w, i.e., ¬φ ∈ w ∈ W. Hence MC, w |= ¬φ, by the Truth
Lemma. Thus: MC, w 6|= φ, MC 6|= φ, and 6|= φ. That is, MC is a universal (for
all φ ∈ L) counter-model (if φ is a non-theorem then MC falsifies φ).
The only proof obligation specific to the semantic-completeness proof for
LIiP is to prove that MC is also an LIiP-model. So let us instantiate our data-
mining operator cla (cf. Page 19) on W by letting for all w ∈ W
msgsa(w) := { M | a kM ∈ w },
and let us prove that:
1. If w MCCM w
′ then M ∈ clw′CM (∅)
2. If M ∈ clwCM(∅) then w MCCM w
3. there is w′ ∈ W such that w MCCM w′
4. MCCM ⊆ CMCCM = v
5. (CMCCM ◦MCCM) ⊆ MCCM
6. If M vCM M ′ then MCCM ⊆ M ′CCM
For (1), let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCCM w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if
M ±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Since w is deductively closed,
M ±CM CM kM ∈ w (self-knowledge).
Hence CM kM ∈ w′. Thus M ∈ clw′CM (∅) by the definition of clw
′
CM .
For (2), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ clwCM(∅). Hence CM kM ∈ w due
to the deductive closure of w. Further suppose that M ±CM φ ∈ w. Since w is
deductively closed,
(M ±CM φ)→ (CM kM → φ) ∈ w (ET).
Hence, CM kM → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (3), let w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, and suppose that M ±CM φ ∈ w. Since w is
deductively closed,
(M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ ∈ w (ID).
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Hence, M ∓CM φ ∈ w by modus ponens. That is, ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) ∈ w by defini-
tion. Since w is deductively closed, ¬¬(CM kM∧φ)→ ¬¬φ ∈ w. Hence ¬¬φ ∈ w
by modus ponens. Hence MC, w |= ¬¬φ by the Truth Lemma. Hence for all
w′ ∈ W, if w v w′ then there is w′′ ∈ W such that w′ v w′′ and MC, w′′ |= φ
by definition. Hence φ ∈ w′′ by the Truth Lemma.
For (4), let us first prove that CMCCM = v . So let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose
that w CMCCM w
′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if CM±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Further let
φ ∈ L and suppose that φ ∈ w. Hence if CM±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Since w is
deductively closed,
(CM±CM φ)↔ φ ∈ w (TMM)
Hence CM±CM φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Hence φ ∈ w′ by meta-level modus
ponens. Thus w ⊆ w′, and then w v w′. Conversely, suppose that w v w′.
That is, w ⊆ w′. Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that CM±CM φ ∈ w. Hence
CM±CM φ ∈ w′. Since w′ is deductively closed,
(CM±CM φ)↔ φ ∈ w′ (TMM)
Hence φ ∈ w′ by LIiP-modus ponens. Second, let us prove that MCCM ⊆ CMCCM .
So let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCCM w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if
M ±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that CM±CM φ ∈ w.
Since w is deductively closed,
(CM±CM φ)↔ φ ∈ w (TMM)
Hence φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Since w is deductively closed,
φ→M ±CM φ ∈ w (MM)
Hence M ±CM φ ∈ w by LIiP-modus ponens. Hence φ ∈ w′ by meta-level modus
ponens.
For (5), let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w (CMCCM ◦ MCCM) w′. That is, there
is w′′ ∈ W such that w CMCCM w′′ and w′′ MCCM w′. Thus, (for all φ ∈ L, if
CM±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′′) and (for all φ ∈ L, if M ±CM φ ∈ w′′ then φ ∈ w′).
Further let φ ∈ L and suppose that M ±CM φ ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed,
(CM±CM (M ±CM φ))↔M ±CM φ ∈ w (TMM)
Hence (CM±CM (M ±CM φ)) ∈ w. Hence M ±CM φ ∈ w′′ by the first hypothesis.
Hence φ ∈ w′ by the second hypothesis. Thus w MCCM w′.
For (6), suppose that M vCM M ′. That is, for all w ∈ W, if M ∈ clwCM(∅) then
M ′ ∈ clwCM(∅). Hence for all w ∈ W, if CM kM ∈ w then CM kM ′ ∈ w due to the
deductive closure of w, which contains all the term axioms corresponding to the
defining clauses of clwCM. Hence for all w ∈ W, if MC, w |= CM kM then MC, w |=
CM kM ′, by the Truth Lemma. Hence also, for all w ∈ W, MC, w |= CM kM →
CM kM ′ by the definition of v. Hence for all w ∈ W, CM kM → CM kM ′ ∈ w by
the Truth Lemma. Hence the following intermediate result, called IR,
for all w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, (M ′±CM φ)→M ±CM φ ∈ w,
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by EA. Now, let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCCM w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L,
if M ±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Hence, for all φ ∈ L, if M ′±CM φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′
by IR. Hence w M ′CCM w
′ by definition.
Theorem 4 (Finite-model property). For any LIiP-model M, if M, s |= φ then
there is a finite LIiP-model Mfin such that Mfin, s |= φ.
Proof. By the fact that the minimal filtration [GO07]
Mmin,Γflt := (S/∼Γ ,vmin,Γ, {MRmin,ΓCM }M∈M,VΓ)
of any LIiP-modelM := (S,v, {MRCM}M∈M,V) through a finite Γ ⊆ L is a finite
LIiP-model such that for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ if and only if Mmin,Γflt , [s]∼Γ |= γ.
Following [GO07] for our setting, we define
∼Γ := { (s, s′) ∈ S × S | for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ iff M, s′ |= γ }
vmin,Γ := { ([s]∼Γ , [s′]∼Γ) | (s, s′) ∈ v }
MRmin,ΓCM := { ([s]∼Γ , [s′]∼Γ) | (s, s′) ∈ MRCM }
VΓ(P ) := { [s]∼Γ | s ∈ V(P ) } .
We further fix M ∈ cl[s]∼ΓCM (∅) :iff [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(CM kM), and choose Γ to be the
(finite) sub-formula closure of φ. Hence, we are left to prove that Mmin,Γflt is
indeed an LIiP-model, which means that we are left to prove that vmin,Γ and
MRmin,Γa have all the properties stipulated by the semantic interface of LIiP;
this is straightforward and therefore relegated to Appendix A.2.
Corollary 7 (Algorithmic decidability). LIiP is algorithmically decidable.
Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not φ ∈ LIiP (that is,
`LIiP φ) for some φ ∈ L (and the current choice of M), axiomatic adequacy
allows us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally satisfiable (That is, whether or
not M, s |= ¬φ for some LIiP-model M and state s. Also, M ∈ clsCM(∅) on the
currently chosen message language M is obviously decidable; for other, more
complex message languages including cryptographic messages, see for example
[TGD10] and [BRS10]). But then, the finite-model property of LIiP allows us
to enumerate all finite LIiP-models Mfin up to a size of at most 2 to the power
of the size n of the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or not
Mfin, s |= ¬φ. (First, there are at most 2n equivalence classes for n formulas.
Second, checking intuitionistic negation, which is checking classical negation
within the up-set of the state s with respect to v, within a finite model is also
a finite task.)
Note that the algorithmic complexity of LIiP will depend on the specific
choice of M and the correspondingly chosen term axioms.
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3 Conclusion
We have produced LIiP from LiP with as main contributions those described in
Section 1.2. In future work, we shall work out dynamic and first-order extensions
of LIiP. As roughly related work, we have already mentioned [AI07] (cf. Page 2,
5, 9, and 13) and can further mention [PP13] and [SB13]. In [PP13], a fragment
of an intuitionistic version of the minimal Justification Logic [Art08] (mJL)
is introduced in the context of an ambitious Curry-Howard isomorphism for
modular programming. A similar appreciation can be made of [SB13], which
introduced an intuitionistic fragment of the Logic of (non-interactive) Proofs
(extending mJL) [AI07]. The main contribution of [PP13] as well as [SB13]
seems to be a programming calculus for an axiomatically defined intuitionistic
modal logic rather than logic itself, whereas ours is an intuitionistic modal logic
with an axiomatics and a set-theoretically constructive semantics.
Acknowledgements I thank Olga Grinchtein for spotting a few typos.
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A Remaining proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
For 0, combine MM and MP. For 1–6, 8–9, and 32–35, consult their analogs and
their proofs in LiP [Kra12a]; they require no non-intuitionistic machinery. For
7, apply ID to 6. For 10, combine ET and MM. For 11, consider that:
1. `LIiP M ±CM CM kM self-knowledge
2. `LIiP (M ±CM CM kM)→M ∓CM CM kM ID
3. `LIiP (M ∓CM CM kM)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ CM kM) definition
4. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ CM kM)↔ ¬¬(CM kM) IL
5. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM) 1–4, IL.
For 12, consider that:
1. `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) ET bis
2. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM) CMMC
3. `LIiP ¬¬((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) 1, 2, IL.
For 13, consider that:
1. `LIiP ¬φ→ ¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL
2. `LIiP ¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL (triple-negation law)
3. `LIiP ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬(M ∓CM φ) definition
4. `LIiP ¬φ→ ¬(M ∓CM φ) 1–3, IL.
For 14, consider that:
1. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
2. `LIiP ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL (triple-negation law)
3. `LIiP ¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬(CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) 2, ET bis, IL
32
4. `LIiP ¬(CM kM ∧M ±CM φ)↔ ((M ±CM φ)→ ¬(CM kM)) IL
5. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ)→ ¬(CM kM))↔ ((M ±CM φ)→ ⊥) 4, CMMC, IL
6. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ)→ ⊥)↔ ¬(M ±CM φ) IL
7. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬(M ±CM φ) 1–6, IL.
For 15, inspect 13 and 14. And 16, 17, and 18, are instances of 13, 14, and 15.
For 19, consider ID as well as 16 and 18, and that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
2. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)→ (¬¬(CM kM) ∧ ¬¬φ) IL
3. `LIiP (¬¬(CM kM) ∧ ¬¬φ)→ ¬¬φ IL
4. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ ¬¬φ 1–3, IL.
For 20, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ ¬¬φ EWDN
2. `LIiP φ′ →M ±CM φ′ MM
3. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ′)→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′) 1, 2, IL.
For 21, consider that:
1. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ)→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ) CF
2. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ ID
3. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ)→ ((M ∓CM φ)↔M ±CM φ) 1, 2, IL.
For 22, inspect ET bis; for 23, 22 and 21; for 24 and 25, `LIiP ¬⊥ and 15
and 13, respectively; for 26, MM and ID. For 27, suppose that `LIiP CM kM →
φ. Hence, `LIiP (M ±CM CM kM) → M ±CM φ by R, and `LIiP M ±CM φ by self-
knowledge. Conversely suppose that `LIiP M ±CM φ. Hence `LIiP CM kM → φ
by ET. For 28, instantiate φ in 27 with CM kM ′. For 29, inspect 10 and 27, and
for 30 and 31, MM. For 36, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ±CM (M ±CM φ) (4)
2. `LIiP M ±CM ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) ET bis self-proof
3. `LIiP M ±CM (((M ±CM φ)→ φ) ∧ (φ→M ±CM φ)) 2, definition
4. `LIiP M ±CM ((M ±CM φ)→ φ) 3, proof conjunctions bis
5. `LIiP (M ±CM ((M ±CM φ)→ φ))→ ((M ±CM (M ±CM φ))→M ±CM φ) K
6. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ±CM φ))→M ±CM φ 4, 5, IL
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7. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ±CM φ))↔M ±CM φ 1, 6, IL.
For 37, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)) definition
2. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ))→(¬¬(CM kM) ∧ ¬¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)) IL
3. `LIiP (¬¬(CM kM) ∧ ¬¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ))→ ¬¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL
4. `LIiP ¬¬¬(¬(CM kM ∧ φ))↔ ¬(¬(CM kM ∧ φ)) IL (triple-negation law)
5. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔M ∓CM φ definition
6. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM φ 1–5, IL
7. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ) WMM
8. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ 6, 7, IL.
For 38, consider MM, ID, and that:
1. `LIiP φ→M ±CM φ MM
2. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) WMM
3. `LIiP φ→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) 1, 2, IL.
and also that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
2. `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) ET bis
3. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) 2, IL
4. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧M ±CM φ)↔M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) definition
5. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) 1, 3, 4, IL.
For 39, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ)) ID
2. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM φ MI bis
3. `LIiP M ∓CM φ→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) NMM
4. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM (M ±CM φ) 1–3, IL.
For 40, consider the instance `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′)) → (φ ∨ φ′))
of ET bis, and that `LIiP (φ ∨ φ′) → ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′) by MM. Hence
`LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ)) → ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′)). For 41, consider
27 and 40. For 42, consider that:
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1. `LIiP (M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ))→ ((M ±CM CM kM) ∧M ±CM φ) pr. conj. bis
2. `LIiP ((M ±CM CM kM) ∧M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ IL
3. `LIiP (M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ))→M ±CM φ 1, 2, IL
4. `LIiP M ±CM CM kM self-knowledge
5. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ IL
6. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→ ((M ±CM CM kM) ∧M ±CM φ) 4, 5, IL
7. `LIiP ((M ±CM CM kM) ∧M ±CM φ)→M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ) pr. conj. bis
8. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ) 6, 7, IL
9. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ) 3, 8, IL.
For 43, consider that :
1. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ) EI
2. `LIiP CM kM → ((M ±CM φ)↔ φ) ET bis
3. `LIiP (CM kM ∧ φ)↔ (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) 2, IL
4. `LIiP M ±CM (CM kM ∧ φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) 3, R bis
5. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)↔M ±CM (CM kM ∧M ±CM φ) 1, 4, IL.
For 44, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ (φ ∨ φ′)) definition
2. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ¬¬((CM kM ∧ φ) ∨ (CM kM ∧ φ′)) IL
3. `LIiP ¬¬((CM kM ∧ φ) ∨ (CM kM ∧ φ
′))↔
(¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) ∨ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ′)) IL
4. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′))↔ (¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) ∨ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ′)) 1–3, IL
5. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
6. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ′)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ′) definition
7. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M ∓CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ′) 4, 5, 6, IL.
For 45, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ (CM kM → (φ→ φ′)) ET
2. `LIiP (CM kM → (φ→ φ′))↔ ((CM kM → φ)→ (CM kM → φ′)) IL
3. `LIiP ((CM kM → φ)→ (CM kM → φ
′))→
((CM kM ∧ (CM kM → φ))→ (CM kM ∧ (CM kM → φ′))) IL
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4. `LIiP ((CM kM ∧ (CM kM → φ))→ (CM kM ∧ (CM kM → φ
′)))↔
((CM kM ∧ φ)→ (CM kM ∧ φ′)) IL
5. `LIiP ((CM kM ∧ φ)→ (CM kM ∧ φ
′))→
(¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)→ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ′)) IL
6. `LIiP (¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)→ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ
′))↔
((M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM φ′) definition
7. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM φ′) 1–6, IL.
For 46, consider that:
1. `LIiP φ→M ∓CM φ WMM
2. `LIiP (M ±CM φ′)→ (CM kM → φ′) ET
3. `LIiP ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)→ (φ→ (CM kM → φ′)) 1, 2, IL
4. `LIiP (φ→ (CM kM → φ′))→M ±CM (φ→ (CM kM → φ′)) MM
5. `LIiP ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)→M ±CM (φ→ (CM kM → φ′)) 3, 4, IL
6. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ (CM kM → φ
′)))↔
M ±CM (CM kM ∧ (φ→ (CM kM → φ′))) EI
7. `LIiP ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ
′)→
M ±CM (CM kM ∧ (φ→ (CM kM → φ′))) 5, 6, IL
8. `LIiP (CM kM ∧ (φ→ (CM kM → φ′)))→ (φ→ φ′) IL
9. `LIiP M ±CM (CM kM ∧ (φ→ (CM kM → φ′)))→M ±CM (φ→ φ′) 8, R
10. `LIiP ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′)→M ±CM (φ→ φ′) 7, 9, IL.
For 47, inspect CF and PS5. For 48, consider that:
1. `LIiP (¬¬φ→ φ′)→ ((M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM φ′) CF
2. `LIiP (¬¬φ′ → φ)→ ((M ∓CM φ′)→M ±CM φ) CF
3. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M ∓CM φ) ∨M ∓CM φ′) PS4
4. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′))→M ∓CM (φ ∨ φ′) ID
5.
`LIiP((¬¬φ→ φ′) ∧ (¬¬φ′ → φ))→
((M ±CM (φ ∨ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ) ∨M ±CM φ′)) 1–4, IL.
For 49, consider that `LIiP (M ∓CM φ) → M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) by MM; thus `LIiP
(M ±CM φ) → M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) by ID; and thus `LIiP φ → M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) by
MM. For 50, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ ID
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2. `LIiP M ±CM ((M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ) 1, N
3. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ±CM φ))→M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ) 2, PS2
4. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM φ MI bis
5. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) MM
6. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ±CM φ))→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) 3–5, IL.
For 51, combine MS and MS bis. For 52, consider the in fact stronger-than-
necessary proof of 38. For 53, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ) ID
2. `LIiP (M ∓CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ MI bis
3. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))→M ∓CM φ 1, 2, IL
4. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) MM
5. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ 3, 4 IL.
For 54, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ±CM (CM kM ∧ ¬¬φ) EI
2. `LIiP (CM kM ∧ ¬¬φ)→ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL
3. `LIiP (M ±CM (CM kM ∧ ¬¬φ))→M ±CM ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) 2, R
4. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ±CM ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) 1, 3, IL
5. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ))↔M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) definition
6. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ±CM (M ∓CM φ) 4, 5, IL
7. `LIiP (M ±CM (M ∓CM φ))↔M ∓CM φ MMI bis
8. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ∓CM φ 6, 7, IL.
For 55, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→M ∓CM φ DNA
2. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ ¬¬φ EWDN
3. `LIiP φ→M ±CM φ MM
4. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ (¬¬φ ∧ (φ→M ±CM φ)) 2, 3, IL
5. `LIiP (¬¬φ ∧ (φ→M ±CM φ))→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) IL
6. `LIiP (M ±CM ¬¬φ)→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) 1, 4, 5, IL.
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For 56, consider that:
1. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
2. `LIiP ¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬(CM kM ∧ φ) IL (triple-negation law)
3. `LIiP ¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ (CM kM → ¬φ) IL
4. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM) CMMC
5. `LIiP (CM kM → ¬φ)↔ (¬¬(CM kM) ∧ (CM kM → ¬φ)) 4, IL
6. `LIiP (¬¬(CM kM) ∧ (CM kM → ¬φ))→ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ ¬φ) IL
7. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ ¬φ)↔M ∓CM ¬φ definition
8. `LIiP ¬(M ∓CM φ)→M ∓CM ¬φ 1–7, IL.
For 57, combine FNDETU and WNC. For 58, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ ¬¬φ EWDN
2. `LIiP φ→M ±CM φ MM
3. `LIiP (¬¬φ ∧ (φ→M ±CM φ))→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) IL
4. `LIiP ¬¬φ→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) 2, 3, IL
5. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)→ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) 1, 4, IL
6. `LIiP (M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ ID
7. `LIiP (¬¬(M ±CM φ) ∧ ((M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ))→ ¬¬(M ∓CM φ) IL
8. `LIiP ¬¬(M ±CM φ)→ ¬¬(M ∓CM φ) 6, 7, IL
9. `LIiP ¬¬(M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) definition
10. `LIiP ¬¬¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔ ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ) triple-negation law
11. `LIiP ¬¬(CM kM ∧ φ)↔M ∓CM φ definition
12. `LIiP ¬¬(M ±CM φ)→M ∓CM φ 8–11, IL
13. `LIiP (M ∓CM φ)↔ ¬¬(M ±CM φ) 5, 12, IL.
For 59, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ±CM φ)→M ±CM φ′) K
2. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∧M ∓CM (φ→ φ
′))→
(((M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→M ±CM φ′) ∧M ∓CM (φ→ φ′)) 1, IL
3. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ→ φ′))↔ ¬¬(M ±CM (φ→ φ′)) MDN
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4. `LIiP (((M ±CM (φ→ φ
′))→M ±CM φ′) ∧M ∓CM (φ→ φ′))↔
(((M ±CM (φ→ φ′))→M ±CM φ′) ∧ ¬¬(M ±CM (φ→ φ′))) 3, IL
5. `LIiP (((M ±CM (φ→ φ
′))→M ±CM φ′) ∧ ¬¬(M ±CM (φ→ φ′)))→
¬¬(M ±CM φ′) IL
6. `LIiP ¬¬(M ±CM φ′)↔M ∓CM φ′ MDN
7. `LIiP ((M ±CM φ) ∧M ∓CM (φ→ φ′))→M ∓CM φ′ 2, 4, 5, 6, IL.
For 60, consider that:
1. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∧ ¬φ))→ ¬¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) EWDN
2. `LIiP ¬¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)→ (¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)→ (φ ∧ ¬φ)) IL (reductio ad absurdum)
3. `LIiP ⊥ → ⊥ IL
4. `LIiP (⊥ → ⊥)↔ ¬⊥ IL
5. `LIiP ¬⊥ ↔ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) IL
6. `LIiP ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) 3, 4, 5, IL
7. `LIiP ¬¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)→ (φ ∧ ¬φ) 2, 6, IL
8. `LIiP (M ∓CM (φ ∧ ¬φ))→ (φ ∧ ¬φ) 1, 7, IL.
A.2 Finite-model property
• vmin,Γ inherits the reflexivity, transitivity, and anti-symmetry from v as
can be seen by inspecting the definition of vmin,Γ;
• MRmin,ΓCM inherits seriality from MRCM, as can be seen by inspecting the
definition of MRmin,Γa ;
• for conditional reflexivity of MRmin,ΓCM , suppose that M ∈ cl[s]∼ΓCM (∅). Thus
consecutively: [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(CM kM) by definition, s ∈ V(CM kM) by defini-
tion, M ∈ clsCM(∅) by definition, s MRCM s by the conditional reflexivity of
MRCM, and finally [s]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM [s]∼Γ by definition;
• for the epistemic-image property of MRmin,ΓCM , suppose that [s]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM
[s′]∼Γ . Thus consecutively: s MRCM s′ by definition, M ∈ cls
′
CM(∅) by the
epistemic-image property of MRCM, s′ ∈ V(CM kM) by definition, [s′]∼Γ ∈
VΓ(CM kM) by definition, and finally M ∈ cl[s
′]∼Γ
CM (∅) by definition.
• For the MIAR-inclusion property of MRmin,ΓCM , suppose that:
– [s]∼Γ CMRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ . Thus consecutively: s CMRCM s′ by definition,
s v s′ by MIAR-inclusion, and [s]∼Γ vmin,Γ [s′]∼Γ by definition.
Proceed similarly for the converse.
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– [s]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ . Thus consecutively: s MRCM s′ by definition,
s CMRCM s′ by MIAR-inclusion, and [s]∼Γ CMRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ by definition.
• For the special transitivity of MRmin,ΓCM , suppose that
[s]∼Γ (CMRmin,ΓCM ◦ MRmin,ΓCM ) [s′]∼Γ .
That is, there is [s′′] ∈ S/∼Γ such that
– [s]∼Γ CMRmin,ΓCM [s′′]∼Γ and
– [s′′]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ .
Thus consecutively: s CMRCM s′′ and s′′ MRCM s′ by definition, s MRCM s′′
by MIAR-inclusion, and [s]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ by definition.
• For the proof monotonicity of MRmin,ΓCM , suppose that M vCM M ′. Further
suppose that [s]∼Γ MRmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ . Thus consecutively: s MRCM s′ by
definition, s M ′RCM s′ by proof monotonicity, and [s]∼Γ M ′Rmin,ΓCM [s′]∼Γ by
definition.
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